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Abstract. Machine learning (ML) models used in medical imaging diagnostics
can be vulnerable to a variety of privacy attacks, including membership inference
attacks, that lead to violations of regulations governing the use of medical data
and threaten to compromise their effective deployment in the clinic. In contrast to
most recent work in privacy-aware ML that has been focused on model alteration
and post-processing steps, we propose here a novel and complementary scheme
that enhances the security of medical data by controlling the data sharing process.
We develop and evaluate a privacy defense protocol based on using a generative
adversarial network (GAN) that allows a medical data sourcer (e.g. a hospital)
to provide an external agent (a modeler) a proxy dataset synthesized from the
original images, so that the resulting diagnostic systems made available to model
consumers is rendered resilient to privacy attackers. We validate the proposed
method on retinal diagnostics AI used for diabetic retinopathy that bears the risk
of possibly leaking private information. To incorporate concerns of both privacy
advocates and modelers, we introduce a metric to evaluate privacy and utility
performance in combination, and demonstrate, using these novel and classical
metrics, that our approach, by itself or in conjunction with other defenses, provides
state of the art (SOTA) performance for defending against privacy attacks.
Keywords: Medical Data Privacy, Generative Models, Retinal Diagnostics.
1 Introduction
There has been a recent proliferation of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learn-
ing (ML) applications being developed and proposed for deployment in various tasks
ranging from vision [12,13,32] to natural language processing and speech [10,20,21,28].
However, ensuring guarantees of privacy for the data used for training those applications
and for medical and retinal AI diagnostics [3,4,7,11,19,25,26,27] is shaping up as an
open impediment to deployment. Generally, privacy in the context of ML is focused on
a trained classification model (classifier) created by a modeler being accessible to an
attacker, allowing them to acquire information about individuals whose data was used
in the training process. The attacker may use the model to infer private attributes (e.g.
age or co-morbidities) about a specific person, in what is called an attribute inference
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membership inference attack [22,24,30], which is the focus of this study. Notably, we
focus on the case of the data being stored in a central location under the provenance of a
trusted agent called a medical data sourcer, acting under an institutional review board
that provides for an individual’s privacy, rather than the federated scenario [15,29,31].
Being able to infer if an individual’s data was used for training has a variety of
possibly severe implications with regard to privacy violations, generically leading to
the discovery – via conflation with other public information – of private information
on the individual, or information on the medical data sourcer, or both. For individuals,
leaking knowledge about membership may cause an attacker to realize that a relationship
between the individual and the healthcare entity exists, which is a problem as the attacker
may have collected additional metadata about the individual that could be a focus for
further attacks. Membership information could also be part of a linkage attack, as both
the image and whether it was used for training may imply additional private information
about the individual. Additionally, the individual may not want the relationship itself to
be known, and violating that desire may erode the trust placed in the healthcare entity.
Finally, membership inference attacks can be considered gateways to even more critical
attacks termed training data reconstruction attacks which allow for recovery of training
data from trained models [6].
As the classifier is the main mode of leakage, most defenses [1,14,17,23,30] focus
on augmenting the model either during training or inference. These schemes all rely on
the modeler to actually implement these measures on the given data, and the medical
data sourcer trusting the modeler or attempting to audit the classifier directly. However,
the incentives for the modeler typically favor pure performance over other concerns,
potentially causing privacy to be an afterthought. Most ways to influence these incentives
are to enforce compliance through regulation such as Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA), rather than explicitly rewarding privacy aware models.
Moreover, unlike more traditional settings in security, typically the only means for
the medical data sourcer to audit the trained model is by the same attacks an attacker
would use, either emboldening modelers who maliciously ignore regulation to improve
performance, as they could pass a different model from what is actually used to auditors,
or not catching ignorant modelers who use bad practices in training.
Thus, this work focuses on how access to the data can be controlled by the medical
data sourcer, namely creating new data points that should not contain the true identities
of the original individuals that can safely be passed to modelers. This work evaluates the
effectiveness of synthetic data for privacy, on retinal imagery collected for the task of
diabetic retinopathy, alongside other defenses that affect the classifier directly. Due to
the degree of data access being controlled, in terms of how many private data points are
shared, there is a question of how to capture the typical trade-off between the privacy
conferred by the model as well as the performance. Consequently this work introduces
an additional metric that attempts to capture the trade off in a single measure, allowing
for negotiation about the level of access between the data sourcer and modeler.
The unique and salient contributions of this work include:
1. We address a rarely considered problem in medical image analytics, i.e. privacy, and
specifically apply it for retinal diagnostics (and more specifically to the classification
of diabetic retinopathy).
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2. We develop a novel strategy for privacy defense that is based on the use of generative
models that only depends on the source of the data, and requires no change in
procedure in training. We believe that this approach can be used more broadly for
other image-based medical diagnostics and other image classification tasks beyond
healthcare.
3. We propose a novel metric, called P1-score, to measure the trade-off between utility
and privacy, so that privacy advocates and modelers can view both concerns together.
2 Prior Work
For defending implementations of classifiers against membership inference attacks, there
exists methods with both empirical and theoretical successes. For empirical methods,
most existing work has focused on regularization of the model during training or in-
ference time. One approach is to reduce overfitting on the training set, as the disparity
between training and testing data could arguably be the primary source for identifying
training data points. Techniques such as dropout [30], which randomly drops part of an
activation layer during training, L2 Regularization [23], which encourages the smaller
weights to help prevent overfitting, and MMD+Mixup [17]. MMD+Mixup combines
Mixup, a data augmentation technique that samples random linear interpolations between
two data points for both the image and the label, and an MMD regularization term that
tries to match the average probability vector between training and validation data. There
are also methods that use an surrogate adversary to defend against membership inference
attacks. For example, Nasr et al. [18] turns training into a minimax procedure, where the
classifier is trying to both classify the training data correctly while fooling an adversary,
which in turn is trained to distinguish between training and reference data. Another
adversarial method called MemGuard [14] is notable, as it only affects inference of the
trained model and is utility preserving. It trains a surrogate to determine membership
using the trained model’s logits as input like [18], and minimally perturbs the trained
model’s logits to fool the surrogate while keeping the same argmax or predicted label.
For theoretical methods, the most prominent example is differential privacy (DP), no-
tably DP-Adam [1], which primarily adds noise to gradients to eliminate that minor
perturbations in the gradient that could leak the identity of the data point.
Every method thus far has either achieved privacy by offering no guarantee of
privacy or typically degrading accuracy. Most methods in the former category, notably
dropout, L2 regularization, and Mixup, were lifted from work studying generalization.
Adversarial methods in the former category typically use a specific adversary to defend
against attacks, and a stronger adversary may nullify such defenses. Turning training
into an adversarial game as with [18] also increases the complexity of training classifiers.
For the latter category, tuning differential privacy to actually confer privacy benefits can
be difficult, complicating the process of training with repeated trial and error, and is, in
general beyond a notion of a privacy budget, opaque to the modeler, causing issues such
as inducing disparity with respect to subpopulations [2].


























Fig. 1: Overview of our proposed approach and description of setting and division of
duties among agents.
3 Methodology
First, we describe in detail the roles the medical data sourcer, the data producer, the
diagnostic modeler, and the attacker play in our methodology, with an overview given in
Figure 1.
The medical data sourcer is a healthcare entity, such as a hospital, that both has
amassed a collection of valuable and private data from individuals and is bound by an
institutional review board or other privacy regulator. Alongside ensuring data privacy
compliance, the regulator also determines how two images are considered to have the
same identity, an equivalence relation ∼I operating on biometrics such as blood vessels
in the retina, and how an image x should be de-identified to produce x̂ such that x∼I x̂.
The data sourcer is approached by the diagnostic modeler for access to the private
data, needed to learn a diagnostic classifier for some medical task, such as diagnosing
diabetic retinopathy. At the end of their process, the modeler desires to have a model that
generalizes the task to unseen data, and is accessible in some way by model consumers
and attackers. Although the modeler simply needs the private data to create a classifier
that works on novel data, common schemes to de-identify typically harm generalization
without consideration by the modeler, as novel images are unlikely to have de-identifying
alterations like masks. Consequently, most modelers are instead authorized to have raw
access to the private data, complicating the liability of the medical data sourcer.
In the case where the data sourcer wants to mitigate privacy leaks from sharing too
much data, they turn to a data producer to de-identify images, as they might not have the
technical expertise themselves. More traditional methods of doing this primarily involve
censoring areas of the image to hide identifiable information as well as hiding metadata.
However, this does not preserve the realism of the images, harming performance of the
resulting model. Consequently, the data producer can instead use other methods, such as
generative adversarial networks, to defend against attackers of the final model attempting
to determine the membership of data points, both detailed next.
3.1 Threat Model
We define our threat model for classifiers using similar notation as that of Carlini et
al. [5]:
Definition 1 (Membership Inference Attack). D = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)} de-
notes a dataset, where xi being images and yi the labels, sampled from p(x, y), acquired
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by the modeler from either the data producer or the data sourcer. This dataset, not known
by the attacker, is used to train a classifier F using training settings S, i.e. hyperparame-
ters, optimizers used, and architecture used but not any defenses used. Given access to
p(x, y), the goal of the attacker is to choose (x∗, y∗) in the support of p(x, y) such that
x∗ ∼I xi, for an equivalence relation ∼I and any i ∈ [n], under one of two different
settings:
– Blackbox setting: where the attacker has access to the model as an oracle G(x),
i.e. whereby the attacker is able to take an input datum and get the probabilities
over y produced by F (x).
– Graybox setting: which allows the adversary access to both G(x) and S.
and the following assumption:
Assumption 1 (Locality of Inference) If a data point x is used to train a classifier F,
then for any data point x̃ 6= x, x∼I x̃ implies that it is not possible for an attacker to
find x∗ using any level of access to F such that x̃ ∼I x∗. In other words, a data point
used for training F does not leak data points that have different identities.
As we are explicitly not focused on reconstruction attacks where the attacker could
learn p(x, y) directly, the attacker is assumed to have ground truth knowledge of it. ∼I
can be interpreted as comparing the identity of the two images, and an equivalence
means that they have the same identity.
3.2 Approach for Data Producer to Defend Privacy
In order to produce data points that are usable by the modeler, there are three desirable
properties for the generated data: (a.) to preserve the original task, i.e. for classification
this means being aligned with a certain class, (b.) to be realistic so that the classifier
trained on this dataset can generalize, and (c.) to ensure that the generated data is not
equivalent to the original data in the sense of ∼I , which by Assumption 1 is sufficient to
preserve privacy. (a.) and (b.) can be effectively resolved by resampling from p(x, y), the
true data distribution. However, the original way to sample from this distribution is to
interact with and acquire data from individuals, which is where the privacy concerns arise.
Consequently, the data producer wants to construct a surrogate distribution p̃(x, y) from
the private data that should mimic the true distribution, but without further interaction
with any individuals.
For this work, we focus on the data producer using Generative Adversarial Networks
(GANs) [9], namely StyleGAN2-ADA [16], to generate this synthetic data. The most
desirable properties of GANs are their ability to create realistic data that should conform
to the true data, which we leverage here. Karras et al. [16] also includes provisions for
training on smaller datasets, enhancing its usefulness for conditions typically found in
medical imagery. To model p(x, y), the generator and discriminator are made conditional
on the label y. The data producer can then fix the desired label and sample from the
generator to create the data to pass to the modeler. See Figures 2 and 3 for real and
synthetic data examples.
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(a) Healthy (b) Diseased
Fig. 2: Example Real Retinal Images. Labels denote the severity of the diabetic retinopa-
thy from 0 to 4, where 0,1 are taken to be healthy and 2,3,4 to be diseased.
To fully satisfy (c.), some way of influencing the sampling to move away from the
original points is needed. However, it is difficult to fully specify ∼I in a mathematical
form, beyond simple, incomplete measures such as those based on a threshold on the L2
distance in the raw pixel space. Thus, for this work, we only ensure that the samples from
the generator do not immediately return the original data points. We take the existence
of realistic samples not from the dataset to be possible since the generator is continuous,
whereas the original dataset and the number of identities within are discrete. Namely,
even if the generator overfits on real data, there must be interpolations between these
points, which are encouraged to be realistic by GAN training.
3.3 Novel Metric Balancing Utility and Privacy
As the medical data sourcer determines what degree of access the modeler has to the
original data, metrics that combine the utility and the privacy leakage of the final model
are needed for determining the level of access. Indeed, we posit that the field of security
and privacy would benefit from the design of more effective metrics that capture possible
tradeoffs between utility and privacy: encouraging higher accuracy for accomplishing
the task, i.e. utility, and attenuating accuracy of the attackers in breaching privacy of
the diagnostics model, i.e. privacy. We propose here to use a novel metric modeled after
the popular F1 score, and which would measure the harmonic mean of the classifier’s
accuracy and the attack’s error rate:




where AccTask,D denotes the accuracy of the defended model, and AccAttack,D denotes
the accuracy of the attacker on the defended model.
4 Experiments
As this work is focused on the perspective of the medical data sourcer worried about
privacy violations, we focus on the worst case scenario of overfitting the trained classifiers
as much as possible [17]. To mimic the varying levels of data access the data sourcer
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Fig. 3: Example Synthetic Retinal Images from Data Producer.
can provide to control privacy leaks, we combine the synthetic data and real data for the
modeler’s training set at different proportions while keeping the overall size constant.
We use ResNet50, initialized to pretrained ImageNet weights, as our diagnostic
classifier, and fix the number of epochs trained to 15 for all experiments, well in excess
of what achieves the best accuracy. The Adam optimizer is used with a batch size of 64,
a learning rate of 5 ∗ 10−5, with β1 = 0.9 and β2 = 0.999, and no validation set is used
for the baseline model. The training set for the classifier is used to train the GAN, with
default training settings besides a batch size of 32, learning rate of 2.5 ∗ 10−3, and R1
penalty of 1. For each mixture of synthetic data and real data, we evaluate both training
with no defenses and training with MMD+Mixup. We partition the training dataset into
80% training and 20% validation. The interpolation weight for Mixup is sampled from
a beta(λ, λ) where λ is between {0, 10}. λ = 5 was found to perform the best with
regards to our combined metric, and is shown in both tables. On real data only, we also
evaluate on MemGuard, with the same settings from the original work. The task accuracy
and attack accuracy are evaluated with respect to the modeler’s datasets.
Most attacks depend on the attacker training their own surrogate model, a shadow
model, on a separate dataset. We use the strongest attack out of these for both the black
and graybox settings, called the loss-threshold attack (Loss-Thre) [30]. This attack uses
the shadow model, for Blackbox a VGG16 network trained for 9 epochs or for Graybox
exactly the same settings as the modeler, to determine the average loss for its training
dataset, and then any image with lower loss is predicted as a member of the training
set. The other attack we use, independent of setting, is the label-only attack [30], which
simply predicts membership for any data points for which the classifier outputs the
correct answer.
4.1 Dataset
For our experiments, we use the EyePACs dataset from Kaggle [8], originally used for a
Diabetic Retinopathy Detection challenge. The dataset includes 88,703 high-resolution
retina images taken under a variety of imaging conditions and each image has a label
ranging from 0 to 4, representing the presence and severity of diabetic retinopathy.
We select 10,000 random images each for modeler’s training and testing set and the
attacker’s training and testing set, all disjoint. The images are cropped to the boundary
of the fundus, and resized to 256 by 256 pixels. The GAN is trained on this version of
the data, whereas the classifier data has additional processing for contrast normalization.
This processing is assumed to be a part of the classifier for attack purposes.
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Table 1: Task and Attack Accuracies (%) of various defenses with different percentages






Loss-Thre Label-Only Loss-Thre Label-Only
Synthetic
Data Only 0%
No Defense 68.77 (0.91) 49.84 (0.69) 49.90 (0.69) 49.85 (0.69) 49.95 (0.69)
MMD+Mixup 73.30 (0.87) 49.67 (0.69) 49.79 (0.69) 49.99 (0.69) 49.79 (0.69)
Synthetic/
Real Mixture
25% No Defense 73.54 (0.86) 53.35 (0.69) 53.10 (0.69) 54.98 (0.69) 53.10 (0.69)
MMD+Mixup 74.10 (0.86) 52.65 (0.69) 52.17 (0.69) 50.05 (0.69) 52.17 (0.69)
50% No Defense 72.95 (0.87) 57.49 (0.69) 56.70 (0.69) 60.31 (0.68) 56.70 (0.69)
MMD+Mixup 73.80 (0.86) 51.91 (0.69) 52.86 (0.69) 50.08 (0.69) 52.86 (0.69)
75% No Defense 75.14 (0.85) 60.43 (0.68) 59.21 (0.68) 66.03 (0.66) 59.21 (0.68)
MMD+Mixup 74.75 (0.85) 54.52 (0.69) 55.41 (0.69) 50.01 (0.69) 55.41 (0.69)
Real Data
Only 100%
No Defense 73.24 (0.87) 64.25 (0.66) 62.70 (0.67) 66.64 (0.65) 62.70 (0.67)
MMD+Mixup 75.52 (0.84) 61.80 (0.67) 59.23 (0.68) 50.08 (0.69) 59.23 (0.68)
Memguard 73.24 (0.87) 63.87 (0.67) 62.70 (0.67) 63.87 (0.67) 62.70 (0.67)






Loss-Thre Label-Only Loss-Thre Label-Only
Synthetic
Data Only 0%
No Defense 58.01 (0.63) 57.97 (0.63) 58.00 (0.63) 57.94 (0.63)
MMD+Mixup 59.68 (0.62) 59.60 (0.62) 59.46 (0.62) 59.60 (0.62)
Synthetic/
Real Mixture
25% No Defense 57.09 (0.61) 57.27 (0.61) 55.85 (0.61) 57.27 (0.61)
MMD+Mixup 57.78 (0.61) 58.14 (0.61) 59.67 (0.61) 58.14 (0.61)
50% No Defense 53.72 (0.61) 54.34 (0.61) 51.41 (0.60) 54.34 (0.61)
MMD+Mixup 58.23 (0.61) 57.53 (0.61) 59.56 (0.61) 57.53 (0.61)
75% No Defense 51.84 (0.60) 52.88 (0.60) 46.79 (0.58) 52.88 (0.60)
MMD+Mixup 56.55 (0.61) 55.86 (0.61) 59.91 (0.61) 55.86 (0.61)
Real Data
Only 100%
No Defense 48.05 (0.59) 49.43 (0.60) 45.84 (0.59) 49.43 (0.60)
MMD+Mixup 50.74 (0.59) 52.95 (0.60) 60.11 (0.61) 52.95 (0.60)
Memguard 48.39 (0.59) 49.43 (0.60) 48.39 (0.59) 49.43 (0.60)
4.2 Results
In Table 1, we see that using only synthetic data for training completely defeats the
attacker (attack probability is close to chance), at the cost of decreased accuracy. Using
MMD+Mixup on synthetic data only improves the task accuracy to be on par with
the original classifier, and close to MMD+Mixup with only real data. Due to its utility
preserving nature, MemGuard does not outperform MMD+Mixup for attack accuracy
nor task accuracy. For most attacks, the attack accuracy with no further training defense
increases roughly linearly with the amount of real data in the training dataset. With
the MMD+Mixup defense, the relationship is less clear, possibly due to the dataset
partitioning. For the combined metric P1(D)Attack in Table 2, we see that synthetic
data only with MMD+Mixup is the best of breed against all attacks except in the
Graybox setting and for the loss-threshold attack, for which the best performance is
obtained by the MMD+Mixup on real data only due to its higher task accuracy, but the
difference between that and the second best method which uses 100 % synthetic data
with MMD+Mixup is barely significant.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a novel approach using generative methods to defend member-
ship inference attacks of retinal diagnostics. We create a new methodology for privacy
defenses by clarifying a new division of labor amongst agents. Our evaluation shows
that the proposed approach has benefits in acting alone or in combination of SOTA
defenses and that it significantly reduces attack accuracy while minimally impacting the
model’s worst case utility. Unlike differential privacy, operating solely on the data allows
modelers relative freedom in how they train and ensure provenance of the data which
also can remain solve ownership of the sourcer. Our approach can also be improved in
the future via better control over the generator and specification of ∼I to better satisfy
privacy advocates, regulators, and modelers together.
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